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Abstract
This paper argues that corruption in developing countries has deep
historical roots which go all the way back to their colonial experience.
We substantiate our thesis with empirical evidence where the degree
of European settlement during colonial times is a powerful explana-
tory factor of present-day corruption. Interestingly, our mechanism is
di¤erent from the prevailing view in the literature on institutions and
growth, where European settlement has only positive e¤ects. We ar-
gue that European settlement leads to higher levels of corruption for
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all countries where Europeans remained a minority in the population,
i.e., for all developing countries.
Keywords: Colonialism; Elite Formation; Corruption.
1 Introduction
This paper sits at the intersection of two empirical literatures that over
the last two decades have greatly advanced our understanding of developing
countries: the literature on the determinants of corruption and the literature
on the socioeconomic consequences of colonialism.1
The literature on the empirical determinants of corruption has grown
exponentially since its beginnings in the mid-1990s, when the rst measures
of the perception of corruption were made available and international aid
donors like the World Bank named ghting corruption a policy priority.2
Although much has been learned since then, the literature has always been
challenged by the di¢ culty of establishing causality.
1Lambsdor¤ (2006) and Treisman (2007) provide useful surveys of the corruption liter-
ature. Important contributions are Mauro (1995), Ades and Di Tella (1997), La Porta et
al. (1999) and Treisman (2000). Among the many contributions to the literature on the
socioeconomic consequences of colonialism we can mention La Porta et al. (1997, 1998),
Acemoglu et al. (2001), Glaeser et al. (2004), Angeles (2007), Angeles and Neanidis
(2009), Huillery (2009) and Dell (2010). See also the survey by Nunn (2009).
2The World Banks World Development Report (1997) is devoted to how bureaucratic
corruption leads to bad policies, while the relationship between corruption and aid is
addressed in World Bank (1989, 1998).
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Causality is di¢ cult to establish because many of the explanatory fac-
tors analyzed in the literature could plausibly be a¤ected by corruption.
To name but two examples, Brunetti and Weder (2003) argue that press
freedom will deter corruption while Swamy et al. (2001) and Dollar et al.
(2001) propose that a larger share of women in government will also lower
corruption levels. In both cases one could well argue for the reverse e¤ect,
with corrupt governments constraining the press and limiting the access of
women to government. These problems are well recognized in the literature,
but convincing solutions are rare due to the di¢ culty of nding appropriate
instruments.
The most powerful explanatory factor of corruption is the level of eco-
nomic development as measured by GDP per capita. Current levels of GDP
per capita typically show correlation coe¢ cients with measures of corrup-
tion in the region of 0:8 (Treisman 2007, p. 223) and explain much of the
variation in the data. The problem with this relationship is that reverse
causality is evidently suspect. We may note, however, that tests carried out
instrumenting for GDP per capita with geographical or historical variables
typically do not a¤ect the results (Treisman 2000, 2007).
The literature has also explored the role of historically determined vari-
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ables that may have a direct e¤ect on corruption. The most important vari-
ables in this set are the legal origin of the country, the religions professed
by its population, the degree of ethnic fractionalization, and the identity
of the colonial power formerly established in its territory (if the country
was colonized). Since all these variables are determined by events that took
place in the distant past, they are usually considered as credible sources of
exogenous variation to explain current levels of corruption.
It is thus the case that colonial heritage has been advanced as a potential
determinant of corruption. The most careful analysis of this link is proba-
bly found in Treisman (2000), who nds that former British colonies have
signicantly lower levels of corruption.3 No similar e¤ect is found for former
colonies of other European nations and - perhaps surprisingly - the simple
fact of having been colonized appears to be unrelated to current levels of
corruption. The main contribution of this paper is to argue that a particular
aspect of the colonial experience, the degree of European settlement in colo-
nial times, is not just a powerful determinant of corruption today but also
that it matters more than other aspects of colonialism such as the identity
3Treisman (2000) adds that This is not due to greater openness to trade or democracy,
and is probably not explained by Protestant or Anglican religious traditions. It may
reect greater protections against o¢ cial abuse provided by common law legal systems.
But slightly stronger evidence suggests that it is due to superior administration of justice
in these countries(p. 426-427).
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of the former colonial power.
Turning to the literature on the socioeconomic consequences of colonial-
ism, a large number of papers have stressed the long term e¤ects of colo-
nialism on institutional quality and economic development (Hall and Jones
1999; Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; Rodrik et al. 2004), on company law
and the administration of justice (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998), on income
inequality (Angeles 2007) and on aid e¤ectiveness (Angeles and Neanidis
2009). It seems clear that the current situation of most developing nations
is, if not historically determined, at least heavily path-dependent.
In much of this recent literature on the consequences of colonialism
an important consideration is the type of colonial experience. While this
can be potentially measured along di¤erent dimensions, an aspect that
has attracted much attention is the degree of European settlement in the
colonies. European settlement varied from small numbers (most of Sub-
Saharan Africa, India, South-East Asia) to large inows (Latin America,
Southern Africa) to four cases where Europeans actually became the vast
majority of the population (the United States, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand).
The most inuential line of work within this literature has argued for a
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positive e¤ect of the degree of European settlement on desirable socioeco-
nomic outcomes. Indeed, according to Acemoglu et al. (2001) Europeans
established extractive institutionswherever they set up in few numbers,
and growth-promoting institutions when they settled in large numbers. The
authors then use determinants of European settlement, such as mortality
rates, as instruments for present-day institutional quality and are able to
show a positive e¤ect of institutions on economic development.
This paper advances a mechanism in the opposite direction: namely
that European settlement may result in worse socioeconomic outcomes, in
this case a higher level of corruption. This e¤ect takes place in addition
to the e¤ect identied by Acemoglu et al. (2001) which works through
the benets of economic development. As we discussed above, the level of
economic development is well-recognized as the most powerful determinant
of corruption. If European settlement leads to economic development along
the lines of Acemoglu et al. (2001), then it will also lead to lower levels of
corruption. However, once we factor out the e¤ect of economic development
by controlling for GDP per capita, what we nd is that higher European
settlement leads to more corruption. The rationale for this relationship is
discussed below.
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In all colonized countries Europeans placed themselves at the top of
the social structure. This, however, does not mean that their capacity to
control and prot from a countrys resources was similar everywhere. In
countries where Europeans were but a small part of the total population,
their grip on economic production was limited by their necessary reliance
on local leaders to ll all middle and lower ranges of political and economic
administration. In 1913, when the colonization of Sub-Saharan Africa had
been completed, the number of Europeans in all French and British African
colonies outside South Africa was a mere 75,000 people.4 There were simply
not enough Europeans to ll the ranks of tax collectors, public servants and
middle managers for a whole continent. Power had to be shared between
the European elite and the local leaders to have a functioning economy.
A larger degree of European settlement implied a more powerful elite,
as the control of these settlers over the countrys resources increases and
the capacity of the rest of the population to present a credible opposition
diminishes. In regions such as Latin America or Southern Africa, European
settlers were able to expropriate most of the land and mining resources
and direct themselves their economic exploitation (either with the use of
4Etemad (2007, p. 191). French colonies had about 27,000 Europeans, British ones
about 48,000.
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domestic labour or with slave labour). We note that such developments
often took place despite the wishes and o¢ cial policy of European govern-
ments. European settlers followed their own interests, which were usually
in opposition to those of the domestic population. European governments
were reticent to see these settlers becoming too powerful, taking a larger
share of colonial production for their own use and potentially challenging
the metropolisauthority. But their capacity to do something about it was
in inverse proportion to the number and strength of the settlers.
As an example of this phenomenon, consider the di¤erence in land policy
between two British colonies in Africa: Nigeria and South Africa. In Nigeria,
where European settlement was very limited and Britains interest lay in the
expansion of the production of cash crops such as cotton, cocoa, groundnuts
and palm oil, a 1917 law forbid the acquisition of land by Europeans. In
South Africa, where European settlers were a sizeable part of the population
and had the means to impose their interests, a 1913 law forbid the acquisition
of land by Africans outside some strictly delimited reservesconstituting
8% of the countrys territory. The di¤erence was not due to the identity
of the colonial power, which was Britain in both cases, but arguably to the
degree of European settlement. Thus, while an European elite was at the
top of society in both Nigeria and South Africa, its capacity to benet from
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the countrys resources at the expense of the local population was much
higher in South Africa.
Thus, the degree of European settlement determined the power of the
elite in colonized countries and this elite was able to maintain its privi-
leges up to the present - as shown by the relationship between European
settlement in colonial times and inequality today (Angeles 2007). A more
powerful elite is also more likely to engage in acts of corruption that procure
a benet for itself at the expense of the rest of society. Here we have in mind
acts of major corruption, such as the embezzlement of foreign aid funds or
the mispricing of government projects. The negative consequences of such
acts fall disproportionally on the non-elite, who are the main beneciaries
of foreign aid and public expenditures on health and education. If economic
power translates into political power and control over institutions such as
the judiciary, then the more powerful the elite, the less likely its members
will be penalized for acts of corruption.5
This positive association between European settlement and elite power
breaks down, however, in the four cases where European settlers became the
5This assumes that the elite cares little for the well-being of the non-elite. The as-
sumption is made more credible by the fact that we are focusing on elites of a foreign
extraction. Evidence supporting the idea that people are not willing to contribute in the
provision of public goods if beneciaries belong to ethnic groups other than their own can
be found in Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina et al. (1999) and Luttmer (2001).
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majority of the population. In these cases the elite faced a population who
could not be subdued or expropriated easily and had the knowledge, human
capital, and political rights to form a credible opposition to any threats on
their well-being. As Engerman and Sokolo¤ (2005, p.8) have pointed out,
early attempts of social organization in the British colonies of North America
were highly unequal, with land concentrated in a few hands and the use of
European indentured labour in agricultural production. But the system
quickly unraveled given that there was no way to stop European workers
from establishing themselves in empty land and becoming their own bosses.
The northern colonies of what was to become the United States evolved to a
system of family-sized agricultural units with important limits on the power
of the elite.
Our hypothesis is then that European settlement in colonial times has
a positive e¤ect on corruption levels today, as long as we limit our study
to countries where European settlers remained a minority in the popula-
tion (and would thus constitute an elite). Most of our analysis is therefore
done without the four exceptions of the United States, Canada, Australia
and New Zealand. We do, however, test the relationship between Euro-
pean settlement and corruption when these countries are included and nd,
intuitively, an inverted-U shape. Indeed, corruption would increase with Eu-
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ropean settlement over most of the sample as higher settlement leads to more
powerful elites. After some point, however, Europeans themselves become
part of the non-elite, leading to less power imbalances and lower corruption.
Through most of the paper we chose to stress the linear relationship over
the non-linear one as this last one depends on just four observations and
may therefore be considered less robust. For most countries in our sample,
and for all developing countries, European settlement and corruption are
positively related.
Before turning to the presentation of our empirical methodology and
results, a few additional comments are in order. First, our story provides an
explanation for the unsatisfactory result, mentioned above, that the simple
fact of having been colonized is not related to corruption. As we have
argued, only some types of colonial experiences are unequivocally linked
to high corruption levels and the crucial factor is the degree of European
settlement.
Second, we do not think that Europeans have a natural tendency to-
wards corruption or that they are on average more corruptible than the rest
of humanity. What we do believe is that people, irrespective of their ethnic
background, tend to enter into acts of corruption when they have the chance
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to do so without much fear of punishment and when the consequences of
these acts are felt by groups other than their own. Because of historical rea-
sons Europeans found themselves in such a position in several parts of the
globe, while peoples of other nations rarely did so. Moreover, after indepen-
dence the elite of former colonized countries remained of European origin
only in the cases of large European settlement (Latin America, Southern
Africa). In most other cases the European elite was replaced by a domestic
elite which took over the privileges of the departing one and whose power,
in accordance with the above discussion, remained limited in comparison to
the cases of large European settlement.
A third and nal remark concerns the measures of corruption that our
story relates to. As we already mentioned, the corruption of governing elites
is major corruption, very di¤erent from the petty corruption of police
o¢ cers and tra¢ c controllers. Thus, measures of experienced corruption,
based on surveys where people are asked if they have actually been forced to
pay a bribe in the recent past, are not adequate for us. For the vast majority
of surveyed people small bribes are all they will ever experience directly and
participants of large corruption cases will have all the incentives not to report
about them in a survey. We will thus use measures of perceived corruption,
based on the assessment of experts or business people. Although these
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measures su¤er from the biases and priors of those asked for an opinion, by
asking about the overall level of corruption in a country they tend to shift
the attention towards the high-level corruption cases that we are meant to
capture.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the data and the empirical methodology to be used. Sections 3 to 5 contain
our econometric results and build up our case through a series of alterna-
tive tests and robustness checks. Section 6, nally, o¤ers some concluding
remarks.
2 Data and methodology
Our baseline econometric specication is the following:
Ci = + logyi + 1Settlersi +
P
j
jXji + "i: (1)
In equation (1) Ci is a measure of corruption for country i, yi is GDP
per capita and Xji is a set of additional determinants of corruption. Our
main variable of interest is Settlers, a measure of the degree of European
settlement in colonial times. This variable is taken from Angeles (2007)
and Angeles and Neanidis (2009) and measures the percentage of European
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settlers with respect to total population in colonial times.6 The variable
takes a value of zero for non-colonized countries, a group that includes all
European nations. Colonialism is understood here as the process of conquest
of overseas territories, so the numerous and continuous conquests made by
European nations within Europe are not part of it. Settlers is assumed to
be exogenous in our baseline regressions, but its potential endogeneity is
discussed and addressed in the rest of our empirical analysis.
GDP per capita will be present in almost all of our regressions as a con-
trol variable. Its inclusion is of particular importance not just because it is
usually seen as the most powerful explanatory factor of corruption, but also
to isolate the direct e¤ect of European settlement on corruption that we fo-
cus on from the indirect one stemming from Acemoglu et al. (2001). Besides
GDP per capita, a large set of additional control variables are considered in
our analysis. Particular attention is given to other historically-determined
explanatory factors of corruption which may be correlated with European
settlement in colonial times. We then extend the analysis to incorporate
contemporaneous factors which have gured in the literature on the deter-
6Di¤erent regions of the world were colonized at di¤erent times, and the values in
Settlers correspond to the situation at the height of each countrys colonial period. The
original sources of Settlers are Etemad (2000) and McEvedy and Jones (1978). The
variable measures European settlers in overseas colonies only (that is, it does not measure
settlement in contiguous territorial conquests that may be classied as colonies such as
the former Soviet Empire).
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minants of corruption.7
Figure 1 here
Our baseline measure of corruption is the World Banks control of cor-
ruption index for the year 2005 constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2009). We
will also use alternative years and measures such as the Transparency Inter-
national (TI) corruption index and the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) corruption index. All these measures take higher values for bet-
ter outcomes, i.e., they are actually measuring the absence of corruption.
To avoid confusion, we transform them so that higher values denote more
corruption. Thus, the expected sign for the coe¢ cient of Settlers is posi-
tive. An initial assessment of this relationship is given in Figure 1, where a
positive relationship between the degree of European settlement and corrup-
tion is apparent for countries where settlers constitute the minority in the
population. This provides some visual support to our thesis before turning
to a formal empirical analysis. Summary statistics for the most important
variables in our analysis are provided in Table 1.
Table 1 here
7The dataset of these control variables has been put together by Treisman (2007) and
is available at:
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/Pages/publishedpapers.html
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Our empirical examination uses cross-sectional regressions and not panel
methods since corruption measures are not directly comparable over time,
even when produced by the same agency, due to changes in sources and
methodology (Treisman 2007).8 Another reason for using cross-sectional
techniques is because all control variables in the baseline regression, other
than GDP per capita, are time-invariant. Ordinary Least Squares, Weighted
Least Squares and Instrumental Variables regressions are employed as alter-
native econometric methodologies.9
3 Baseline results
We begin by assuming that Settlers and GDP per capita are both exogenous
determinants of corruption, an assumption that we will relax in the rest of
the analysis. Under this assumption OLS estimation will result in unbiased
and e¢ cient estimates, and we report the results under this methodology in
Table 2.
Table 2 here
8Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) show that for the World Bank index of control of cor-
ruption about half the variance over time results from changes in the sources used and
their respective assigned weights.
9We opt using the two-step e¢ cient GMM estimator, rather than the traditional two-
stage least-squares estimator, because it generates e¢ cient estimates of the coe¢ cients as
well as consistent estimates of the standard errors.
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The rst column of Table 2 presents the bivariate relationship between
corruption and the degree of European settlement in the absence of any
controls when the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are
included in the sample. The coe¢ cient on Settlers is negative and statisti-
cally signicant, which we take as evidence of the powerful e¤ect of European
settlement on economic development and, as a side e¤ect, on corruption -
in accordance with Acemoglu et al. (2001). If this interpretation is correct,
we would expect to see no relationship between European settlement and
corruption once the intermediating channel is controlled for; that is, once
GDP per capita is included in the regression. This is precisely what happens
in column 2, with GDP per capita having a strongly negative and statis-
tically signicant e¤ect on corruption while European settlement becomes
statistically not signicant.
The absence of a relationship in column 2, however, is masking a statisti-
cally signicant e¤ect that arises when the United States, Canada, Australia
and New Zealand, the four countries for which Europeans represent the ma-
jority of the population, are excluded from the sample. This is done in the
third column of the table, resulting in a positive e¤ect of Settlers on cor-
ruption which is statistically signicant at the 1% level, as we hypothesized.
It follows that the degree of European settlement is associated with higher
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corruption for most of the sample - an e¤ect that works in addition to the
mechanism that can be derived from Acemoglu et al. (2001) and acts in the
opposite direction.
Turning to the size of the e¤ect, the estimated coe¢ cient from column
3 implies that an increase in the percentage of European settlers of 30%,
roughly the di¤erence between areas where Europeans settled very lightly
such as tropical Africa and areas where they settled in important numbers
like Latin America, is associated with a level of corruption 0:48 points higher.
This is a large e¤ect, considering that the standard deviation of our measure
of corruption is 1:
The rst potential problem with this result is that it may be biased by the
omission of other historical factors correlated with the degree of European
settlement. We explore this possibility in the remaining columns of Table
2, where we control progressively for the identity of the colonial power, the
legal origin of the country, religion, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization.
The identity of the colonial power is probably the rst variable that
would come to mind for correcting an omitted variable bias. Our settlers
variable may just be picking up the fact of having been colonized, which
could have consequences for corruption levels independently of settlement
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patterns. To test for this possibility we introduce four dummy variables that
identify the former colonies of Britain, France, Spain or Portugal, and any
other nation - the excluded category being the set of non-colonized countries.
For consistency with our Settlers variable, we consider as colonies only over-
seas territories. As the results in column 4 show, the relationship between
settlers and corruption is essentially una¤ected by this addition while none
of the four dummy variables identifying a former colonial power has a statis-
tically signicant e¤ect on corruption. This conrms our prior regarding the
e¤ects of colonialism on present-day corruption: namely, that the degree of
European settlement is a far more important factor than whether a country
was colonized by, say, France instead of Spain.
In a similar vein, column 5 of Table 2 adds the legal origin of the country
as a control variable. The correlation between legal origin and the identity
of the colonial power is positive but not too high, since many countries imi-
tated the legal framework of a major European country without there being
a colonial link. This time we nd negative e¤ects of legal origin on corrup-
tion, particularly large for countries associated with Scandinavian and Ger-
man legal traditions (the excluded category being countries with a Socialist
tradition). This does not, however, dissipate the existence of a positive re-
lationship between corruption and European settlement: the coe¢ cient of
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interest remains almost unchanged, albeit now signicant at the 10% level.
Columns 6 and 7 of Table 2 also control for the percentage of the popu-
lation professing the Catholic, Muslim and Protestant faith and for ethno-
linguistic fractionalization. None of these variables presents a statistically
signicant e¤ect on corruption and their coe¢ cients are all very small. The
e¤ect of European settlement, on the other hand, remains large and signi-
cant. Because of their lack of statistical signicance, the variables measur-
ing religious allegiance and ethnolinguistic fractionalization will be excluded
from the rest of the empirical analysis while all other controls are kept
throughout. Column 8 in Table 2 uses weighted least squares and weights
countries by the inverse of their standard errors. This allows placing less em-
phasis on cases where perceived corruption is measured with less precision.
As expected, WLS produces more precise estimates with the coe¢ cient on
Settlers reaching a p-value of 5.8% (as opposed to 8.2% in column 5).
The last column, nally, incorporates a squared value of Settlers and
reintroduces the four countries that experienced large levels of European
settlement. In this case, we see that both Settlers and its square are highly
statistically signicant and that the signs of their coe¢ cients are positive
and negative respectively, giving rise to an inverted-U relationship between
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European settlement and corruption. Thus, larger levels of European set-
tlement would engender a more powerful elite and increase corruption, but
the relationship changes direction when European settlers become the ma-
jority of the population. The turning point for the resulting curve is found
for a value of European settlers of about 38% of the total population. As
discussed before, we chose to focus on the linear relationship in the rest of
the paper since this non-linear e¤ect depends on just four observations.
To summarize, results in Table 2 conform to our hypothesis regarding
the role of European settlement after controlling for a number of alternative
historical forces. Other than the well-known role of GDP per capita, we
nd that the dummy for British colonies and all legal origin dummies are
related to current levels of corruption at least at the 10% level of statistical
signicance. The positive e¤ect of European settlement on corruption comes
on top of the e¤ect of these variables.
4 Addressing endogeneity
A concern with the above baseline results is the potential endogeneity of
our variable of interest, Settlers, and of our main control variable, GDP per
capita. Reverse causality is a concern for GDP per capita, since corruption
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may hinder economic development. For Settlers the main concern is omitted
variable bias, as the data does not allow us to control for country-specic
factors using xed e¤ects.
It is important to note that the endogeneity of Settlers could bias results
in either direction. Assume, for instance, that our baseline regression is
biased due to the omission of a set of factors we may refer loosely as "cultural
aspects". Indeed, certain cultural aspects may result in higher corruption
levels and, at the same time, may render a country more or less attractive
to European immigrants. If the rst, and Europeans are attracted by the
rapid route to wealth that a corrupt society may o¤er them, the omission
is causing an upward bias on the coe¢ cient of Settlers: If the second, and
Europeans look for the long-term benets to themselves and their children
that derive from a low corruption society, the omission is causing a downward
bias on the coe¢ cient of Settlers:We let the data tell us which of these two
explanations ought to be credited.
We address these issues by instrumenting for European settlement and
GDP per capita using a set of geographic and historically-determined vari-
ables. The instrument set includes the latitude of the country (in absolute
22
value), its population density in the year 1500, its degree of malaria preva-
lence, the fraction of its territory within 100 km of the sea, and a dummy
variable taken from Easterly and Levine (2012) giving the value of 1 to
countries that experienced episodes of large indigenous mortality following
their rst contact with Europeans (essentially countries in the Americas and
Oceania). Our instrument set must satisfy the conditions of relevance and
exogeneity, and we turn to discuss each of these in turn.
Our instruments are relevant since they had multiple inuences on the
degree of European settlement in colonial times and on economic develop-
ment. Europeans were attracted towards temperate regions that resembled
their own climate rather than the heat and humidity of the tropics, and this
aspect is captured by latitude. As discussed by Easterly and Levine (2012),
indigenous mortality also facilitated European settlement by eliminating re-
sistance and previous claims to land. More densily populated areas would
also have been more di¢ cult to settle for the same reasons. Turning to GDP
per capita, climate has long been regarded as having an inuence on devel-
opment; for instance by making the adoption of agricultural technologies
more di¢ cult or by increasing the prevalence of infectious diseases. These
aspects are captured by latitude and malaria prevalence. Access to the sea
is also a major factor as it improves the prospects of integration with the
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world economy and the gains from trade. Thus our measure of land within
100 km of the sea should be expected to positively a¤ect income per capita.
Consider next exogeneity, which requires that our instruments are not
correlated with corruption after controlling for European settlement, GDP
per capita, and all additional second-stage regressors. Unless we are willing
to countenance notions of geographic or climatic determinism, variables such
as latitude or malaria prevalence should not have an e¤ect on corruption
other than through economic development. A tropical climate does not make
people more corrupt, just as it does not make them lazy or less intelligent,
but it does put constraints on economic growth.
Proximity to the sea, on the other hand, may potentially have a separate
e¤ect on corruption through its e¤ect on trade. Indeed, access to the sea
is an important determinant of trade ows and, as argued by Ades and
Di Tella (1999), international trade may decrease corruption by increasing
competition and reducing rents of domestic rms. We address this concern
by adding trade openness (imports plus exports as a percent of GDP) as an
additional determinant of corruption in our second-stage regression. Trade
is also treated as an endogenous variable since a corrupt government may
erect trade barriers in order to prot from them.
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Finally, there may also be some question marks regarding the exogeneity
of our two historically-determined instruments, population density in 1500
and the indigenous mortality dummy. The rst one has often been used as
an indicator of economic development in pre-industrial times, and may thus
capture socioeconomic aspects that made countries richer. Such aspects may
be time-invariant and continue to a¤ect development - and thus corruption
- up to this day. However, with economic development being controlled for
in our second-stage regression, this channel should not be a concern. As
for the episodes of large indigenous mortality, their ocurrence is explained
entirely by the lack of previous contact between the population in question
and Europe; which made these population defenseless to the Old Worlds
germs. Thus, they do not reect socioeconomic aspects that could be related
to corruption.
Table 3 here
Table 3 presents our baseline results with instrumental variables regres-
sions. Columns 1 and 2 instrument for European settlers, while columns 3
and 4 also instrument for GDP per capita. Finally, column 5 adds trade
openness to the list of regressors and to the list of instrumented variables.
As we move from column 1 to column 5 we increase progressively the number
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of instruments in our instrument set, including all ve of them in columns 4
and 5.10 The upper panel of the table presents the second-stage regressions,
while rst-stage regressions are reported at the lower panels.
The rst-stage results demonstrate that our set of instruments is indeed
capable of explaining a large fraction of the variation in our two main en-
dogenous variables. In all these regressions, the F test easily rejects the null
hypothesis of no e¤ect from the instrument set and the fraction of variation
explained by our instrument set is above 0.8 for European settlers and above
0.6 for GDP per capita.
By and large, instruments have the expected e¤ect on our endogenous
variables. Population density and malaria prevalence are negatively related
to European settlement while the dummy for indigenous mortality has a
large positive e¤ect. We also conrm our priors regarding the e¤ects of
latitude, risk of malaria transmission, and fraction of land close to the sea
on GDP per capita. Finally, the lowest panel of Table 3 shows that proximity
to the sea works very well as an instrument for trade openness.
Turning to the second-stage results, ndings corroborate those of the
10This procedure lets us test whether results depend on a large set of instruments that
yield a high R2 coe¢ cient as a way of counteracting the ine¢ ciency of instrumenting.
This is particularly relevant for cross-sectional regressions.
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benchmark regressions: a strong positive e¤ect of European settlement on
current-day corruption. Compared to Table 2, the estimated e¤ect is about
twice as large in magnitude (a coe¢ cient of about 0:030 as opposed to 0:015)
and statistically signicant at least at the 5% level in all cases. This larger
e¤ect implies a downward bias in our baseline estimates which, according
to our interpretation above, would suggest that cultural aspects leading to
more corruption were unattractive to European immigrants.
Similarly, after instrumentation, GDP per capita retains its negative ef-
fect on corruption at the 1% level. The coe¢ cient on GDP per capita is
almost unchanged when treated as endogenous, suggesting that endogeneity
is not an important issue for this factor given our full set of determinants
of corruption. Furthermore, results in column 5 conrm that controlling for
trade openness in the second stage regression does not change the main out-
comes, while trade openness has no impact on corruption. Thus, European
settlement a¤ects corruption when we control for any potential e¤ect of our
instruments working through its inuence on trade.
Standard specication tests indicate the validity of the instruments. In
addition to the high F statistics reported in the rst-stage regressions, we
now nd that both the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) LM and F tests reject the
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null hypotheses of underidentication and weak identication, respectively,
of the excluded instruments.11 Further, we use the Hansen overidentica-
tion J-test to examine whether the instruments are orthogonal to the error
process in the regression, i.e., whether the instruments explain corruption
beyond their e¤ects on Settlers and GDP per capita. The high p-value sug-
gests that the instruments do not reject the overidentication test meaning
that they are indeed jointly valid. We also report the Shea partial R-square
for the instrumented variables, of which the relatively large values point to
the relevance of the instruments in explaining the instrumented variables.
In general, the instrumental variable approach appears to be support-
ive of our story, in that greater European settlement in colonial times is a
powerful explanatory factor of present-day corruption.
5 Robustness checks
We test the robustness of our results in four di¤erent dimensions. First,
we consider alternative samples of countries. Second, we use alternative
measures for European settlement and consider interaction e¤ects between
11The high F statistic in columns 1,2 and 4 on the overall strength of the rst stage due
to Kleibergen and Paap (2006) far exceeds the frequently used critical values tabulated
by Stock and Yogo (2005). For a 20% tolerable bias, the smallest bias Stock and Yogo
(2005) consider, for i.i.d. errors with one endogenous variable, is 8.75.
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European settlement and colonizing power. Third, we use di¤erent mea-
sures of corruption. Fourth, we add a large number of additional control
variables from the literature on the determinants of corruption. All these
extensions include the standard set of control variables considered in Table
3 and instrument for European settlement and GDP per capita.
Table 4 here
Table 4 starts by reporting our results with alternative country samples.
Our baseline sample pools together colonized and non-colonized countries,
since we think of European settlement in colonial times as an historical shock
whose consequences should be gauged by comparison with the places where
it did not happen. We do recognize, however, the relevance of investigating
whether the presence of non-colonized countries in our sample is driving
the results. In columns 1 to 5 we exclude increasingly broad sets of non-
colonized countries whose presence could be of concern: (i) high income
countries in Europe, (ii) high income countries in Europe and elsewhere,
(iii) all European countries, (iv) all European countries plus high-income
countries outside Europe, (v) all non-colonized countries.
Our denition of high income countries is from the World Bank. Notice
that the correspondence between high-income and non-colonized countries is
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close but not perfect. A few low-income countries have never been colonized
by Europeans (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Thailand), while a few high-income
countries have been (Hong Kong, Singapore). The last two columns of Table
4 keep the most restrictive sample of only non-colonized countries and adds
to our list of instruments the settlers mortality measure from Acemoglu et
al. (2001) and the revised version of this measure from Albouy (2012). The
measure is well recognized in the literature as a determinant of European
settlement and it is thus of interest to include it.
The results in Table 4 are clearly supportive of our thesis. In all re-
gressions the coe¢ cient on European settlers remains positive and of similar
magnitude as in Table 3. In columns 1 to 5 the coe¢ cient is statistically sig-
nicant at the 10% level, a less precise estimate than in previous regressions
which is perhaps not too surprising given the loss of between 15 and 30% of
the sample. In columns 6 and 7 the coe¢ cient on European settlers is larger
in magnitude and once again statistically signicant at the 5% level. This
suggests that settler mortality is indeed a particularly good determinant of
European settlement and GDP per capita. Unfortunately, this measure is
available for a much more restricted number of countries than what we use
in our baseline regressions (and only for colonized countries). Thus, the rest
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of the paper will use our preferred set of instruments discussed before.
Table 5 considers di¤erent measures of European settlement. Our base-
line measure refers to the percent of European settlers in total population at
the height of each countrys colonial experience, which took place at di¤erent
points in time for di¤erent countries. An alternative would be to measure
the percentage of European settlers or European descendants at some com-
mon date for all countries. We pursue this route here by considering data
on European settlement for the year 1900 (column 1) and 1975 (column
2) from Acemoglu et al. (2001). By 1900 essentially all of the Americas
had become independent, but colonialism was at its height in Africa and
Asia. By 1975 practically all colonized countries had become independent.
Although for most countries the percentage of European settlers or their
descendants did not change much following independence, a few cases exist
where large population movements meant this was not the case (Argentina,
Chile, Uruguay). Our expectation is that these alternative measures will
still capture the size and power of the European elite, albeit less accurately
since much of the European arrivals post-independence came as members of
the working classes.
Table 5 here
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The results in Table 5 conrm our expectations. The coe¢ cients on both
European settlers in 1900 (column 1) and European settlers in 1975 (column
2) are positive and statistically signicant, at the 5% level in the rst case
and at the 10% level in the second case. We then compare the predictive
power of each of these two measures with that of our preferred measure of
European settlement by including them simultaneously in columns 3 and 4.
The results corroborate our choice. While our measure of European settle-
ment in colonial times has the expected positive and statistically signicant
e¤ect on corruption, the two alternative measures are no longer signicant
and their coe¢ cients become small and negative. We interpret this as fur-
ther evidence in favour of our story, whereby elite power was determined
during the colonial period and was thus a function of European settlement
in those times.
The nal column of Table 5 also considers interaction terms of European
settlers with the dummies for former colonies of Britain, France, Spain or
Portugal, or any other nation. The results suggest that the positive e¤ect
of European settlers on present-day corruption characterizes all European
colonies with the exception of British ones. Indeed, while the coe¢ cient on
the British colony interaction is close to zero and non-signicant, those of
all other interactions are positive and statistically signicant. While these
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results should be taken with caution due to the relatively limited number
of colonies for each colonial power, they are in accordance with Treismans
(2000) ndings regarding former British colonies and, more generally, with
a positive view of British institutional heritage within the legal origins lit-
erature.12
Table 6 considers di¤erent measures of corruption.13 While all our pre-
vious results have used the World Bank corruption index for 2005, Table 6
considers this same index for the years 1998, 2002 and 2004, together with
the Transparency International index of corruption and the International
Country Risk Guide measure for the same years. These additional corrup-
tion indicators are also popular in the literature, and all three of them are
typically found to be highly correlated. This is indeed the case in our sample
as their pairwise correlations vary between 0.71 and 0.99.
Table 6 here
12We have also experimented using interaction terms of European settlers with (i) num-
ber of years since independence, and (ii) length of the colonizing period. These may
capture changes in the e¤ect of European settlement along these two magnitudes. In both
cases, however, the interaction term is not statistically signicant and its inclusion ren-
ders Settlers non signicant. Indeed, most cases of high European settlement took place
in countries colonized early on, which remained colonies for a long time, and which have
been independent for many years. Thus, these three measures are highly correlated and
it is not possible to disentangle their e¤ects statistically.
13From this table onwards, to save on space, we do not report the coe¢ cient estimates
of the control variables included in set Xji: identity of former colonial power and legal
origin dummies.
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In all cases we nd the result of a statistically signicant positive rela-
tionship between Settlers and measures of corruption. If we compare the
estimated coe¢ cients for the di¤erent years of the World Bank index we
note that the magnitude of the e¤ects is about the same as in our previous
tables, where the World Bank index for 2005 was used. But for both the
Transparency International and International Country Risk Guide indexes
the e¤ects are larger, with an increase in European settlement of 30% leading
to an increase in corruption of one standard deviation or more.
We next consider a large number of additional control variables that have
gured in the literature on the determinants of corruption. Most of these
variables are not obviously related to the degree of European settlement so
their omission would not have created any bias, which is why we have not
considered them so far. We do so in what follows in order to bring additional
support to our story.
Results are reported in tables 7 and 8, which roughly follow the di¤erent
tests proposed by Treisman (2007). In Table 7 we consider variables that can
be grouped under the heading of political institutions: an index of current
political rights, the number of years under democracy, an index of freedom of
the press, a measure of newspaper circulation, and di¤erent measures of the
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type of political and electoral system in place. Among the papers that have
argued for the importance of some of these variables we can cite Montinola
and Jackman (2002), Treisman (2000), Brunetti and Weder (2003), Adsera
et al. (2003), Panizza (2001) and Persson et al. (2003) among many others.
Table 7 here
As could be expected, political rights and freedom of the press are both
consistently associated with lower corruption; though the direction of causal-
ity is open to discussion.14 For most other political variables we nd e¤ects
that are not statistically signicant. Our central result, however, proves to
be robust to the inclusion of these controls. For all regressions, European
settlers are statistically signicant at least at the 5% level and the estimated
coe¢ cients are remarkably stable.
A similar outcome is presented in Table 8, where we consider the roles
of being a fuel-exporting country, openness to trade, education, measures
of the importance of women in the government, ination, income inequality
and dummies for Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. The literature has
analyzed the e¤ects of these di¤erent factors on corruption in papers like
14Table 7 does not consider political rights and freedom of the press simultaneously since
both measures come from the same source (Freedom House) and are highly correlated.
We have also used the Polity IV measure of political rights with similar results.
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Dollar et al. (2001), Swamy et al. (2001), Braun and Di Tella (2004), Van
Rijckgehem and Weder (2001) or Ades and Di Tella (1999).
Table 8 here
Some of these variables present a statistically signicant association with
corruption, notably fuel exports, the percentage of women in government at
ministerial level, a government partys margin of victory, the fractionaliza-
tion of parties at the legislature, and the dummy for sub-Saharan Africa.
But in all cases we continue to nd the positive and statistically signicant
e¤ect of European settlement on corruption that we hypothesize. In fact,
the coe¢ cient on European settlers does not change by much. Worthy of
notice are the results from the last column of Table 8, where dummy vari-
ables for Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa are included. These show
that controlling for the specicities of these two regions does not eliminate
the e¤ect of European settlement that we capture.
Overall, then, this section has clearly demonstrated the robustness of our
results when controlling for a wealth of additional explanatory factors of cor-
ruption proposed in the literature. As a nal exercise we have tested our
thesis using experienced-based measures of corruption which, as discussed
in the introduction, have no reason to be related to European settlement.
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The measures available come from surveys conducted by Transparency In-
ternational (Global Corruption Barometer survey), the World Bank (World
Business Environment survey), and the United NationsInterregional Crime
and Justice Research Institute (crime victims survey). As expected, we nd
that none of these measures reect a relationship between settlers and ex-
perienced corruption. Results are available upon request.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have argued that corruption in developing countries has
deep historical roots and that colonialism is of paramount importance to its
understanding. Previous attempts at capturing the e¤ect of colonialism on
corruption did not reveal much because all colonial experiences were con-
sidered together. We take the literature forward by di¤erentiating colonial
experiences by the degree of European settlement they brought to the coun-
try. As emphasized by the growing literature on the socioeconomic e¤ects of
colonialism, the degree of European settlement is often of greater importance
than the identity of the colonial power.
Our hypothesis is that European settlement a¤ects corruption by deter-
mining the nature and power of local elites in colonized countries. Europeans
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formed more powerful elites where they settled in larger numbers, and this
allowed them to benet from acts of corruption with impunity since punish-
ment was all too unlikely. Elites tend to perpetuate themselves - particularly
when powerful. That is why the e¤ects of colonial history on elite formation
can be felt on corruption practices today.
Our results present convincing evidence that the above thesis holds in
practice. Controlling for the level of development and a set of exogenous
determinants of corruption we nd that the degree of European settlement
is a powerful explanatory factor of corruption. The result continues to hold
when we address the potential endogeneity of European settlement and of
GDP per capita by using instrumental variables, when we consider alter-
native country samples, alternative measures of European settlement and
alternative measures of corruption. We also control for a large number of
additional explanatory factors of corruption found in the literature.
Overall, then, this paper contributes to our understanding of why cor-
ruption is so persistent in some societies and to our growing awareness of
the implications of the colonial experience on developing countries up to this
day.
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Figure 1 
European Settlement and Corruption 
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(b) Countries with minority of European settlers 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 Mean Std Dev Min Max Obs 
World Bank corruption index (2005) 0.121 1.01 -2.39 1.4 128 
GDP per capita (log) 8.42 1.18 6.35 11.02 128 
Former British colony 0.281 0.451 0 1 128 
Former French colony 0.179 0.385 0 1 128 
Former Spanish or Portuguese colony 0.187 0.392 0 1 128 
Former colony of other power 0.211 0.309 0 1 128 
British legal origin 0.273 0.447 0 1 128 
French legal origin 0.476 0.501 0 1 128 
Scandinavian legal origin 0.031 0.174 0 1 128 
German legal origin 0.039 0.194 0 1 128 
Protestant 12.13 20.41 0 97.8 128 
Catholic 29.80 34.88 0 96.6 128 
Muslim 23.63 35.01 0 99.4 128 
Ethnolingusitic fractionalization 0.487 0.270 0 0.98 128 
European settlers 7.19 17.57 0 98.6 128 
Note: The source of the dataset is Treisman (2007) with the exception of European settlers which come from Angeles (2007). 
The number of observations is based on the benchmark regression column (8) of Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2 
Benchmark Findings 
 
Dependent variable: World Bank corruption index (2005) 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
WLS 
(9) 
WLS 
European settlers -0.016*** 
(0.003) 
-0.003*** 
(0.003) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
0.014* 
(0.008) 
0.014* 
(0.007) 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
0.016* 
(0.008) 
0.023** 
(0.010) 
European settlers squared         -0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
 
         
GDP per capita (log)  -0.699*** 
(0.045) 
-0.689*** 
(0.043) 
-0.685*** 
(0.047) 
-0.622*** 
(0.051) 
-0.606*** 
(0.054) 
-0.608*** 
(0.056) 
-0.644*** 
(0.053) 
-0.645*** 
(0.053) 
Former British colony    -0.004 
(0.186) 
-0.210 
(0.157) 
-0.194 
(0.166) 
-0.286* 
(0.150) 
-0.267* 
(0.152) 
-0.275* 
(0.153) 
Former French colony    0.015 
(0.204) 
-0.219 
(0.184) 
-0.149 
(0.187) 
-0.140 
(0.187) 
-0.235 
(0.186) 
-0.244 
(0.188) 
Former Spanish or Portuguese 
colony 
   0.116 
(0.244) 
-0.094 
(0.246) 
-0.054 
(0.245) 
-0.012 
(0.255) 
-0.144 
(0.252) 
-0.144 
(0.248) 
Former colony of other power    0.285 
(0.178) 
-0.171 
(0.177) 
-0.104 
(0.203) 
-0.084 
(0.200) 
-0.153 
(0.183) 
-0.155 
(0.184) 
British legal origin     -0.378* 
(0.196) 
-0.269 
(0.231) 
-0.180 
(0.223) 
-0.336* 
(0.188) 
-0.341* 
(0.190) 
French legal origin     -0.362*** 
(0.121) 
-0.382** 
(0.167) 
-0.377** 
(0.168) 
-0.319** 
(0.129) 
-0.321** 
(0.129) 
Scandinavian legal origin     -1.57*** 
(0.164) 
-1.12*** 
(0.388) 
-1.13*** 
(0.392) 
-1.52*** 
(0.172) 
-1.52*** 
(0.172) 
German legal origin     -1.01*** 
(0.347) 
-0.920** 
(0.371) 
-0.881** 
(0.360) 
-0.906** 
(0.361) 
-0.906** 
(0.362) 
Protestant      -0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
  
Catholic      0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
  
Muslim      0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
  
Ethnolingusitic fractionalization       0.011 
(0.187) 
  
          
Countries  156 142 138 135 128 126 124 128 132 
R-square 0.072 0.705 0.706 0.709 0.776 0.780 0.787 0.782 0.808 
Notes: Dependent variable is the World Bank corruption index (2005) which measures the presence of corruption. Regressions based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and 
Weighted Least Squares (WLS). White-corrected standard errors in parentheses, which for WLS are weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the dependent variable. 
Constant term not reported. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Benchmark Findings: Instrumental variables 
 
Second stage results 
Dependent variable: World Bank control of corruption index (2005) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
European settlers 0.029** 
(0.011) 
0.031*** 
(0.011) 
0.032*** 
(0.011) 
0.025** 
(0.010) 
0.029** 
(0.014)  
       
GDP per capita (log) -0.669*** 
(0.060) 
-0.685*** 
(0.059) 
-0.731*** 
(0.075) 
-0.687*** 
(0.070) 
-0.743*** 
(0.110) 
 
Former British colony -0.392** 
(0.173) 
-0.402** 
(0.169) 
-0.410** 
(0.179) 
-0.382** 
(0.171) 
-0.433** 
(0.191) 
 
Former French colony -0.267 
(0.189) 
-0.295 
(0.185) 
-0.350* 
(0.203) 
-0.311 
(0.197) 
-0.424 
(0.279) 
 
Former Spanish or Portuguese 
colony 
-0.332 
(0.283) 
-0.332 
(0.288) 
-0.384 
(0.283) 
-0.247 
(0.273) 
-0.409 
(0.396) 
 
Former colony of other power 
except Spain or Portugal 
-0.120 
(0.185) 
-0.148 
(0.183) 
-0.168 
(0.186) 
-0.185 
(0.185) 
-0.233 
(0.216) 
 
British legal origin -0.342* 
(0.202) 
-0.386** 
(0.195) 
-0.417** 
(0.200) 
-0.395** 
(0.199) 
-0.474** 
(0.231) 
 
French legal origin -0.393*** 
(0.124) 
-0.421*** 
(0.122) 
-0.424*** 
(0.120) 
-0.449*** 
(0.119) 
-0.402*** 
(0.146) 
 
Scandinavian legal origin -1.54*** 
(0.165) 
-1.53*** 
(0.167) 
-1.47*** 
(0.178) 
-1.55*** 
(0.170) 
-1.48*** 
(0.198) 
 
German legal origin -0.918*** 
(0.326) 
-0.915*** 
(0.326) 
-0.861*** 
(0.329) 
-0.964*** 
(0.319) 
-0.848** 
(0.373) 
 
Trade openness     0.002 
(0.004) 
 
       
Countries  107 106 103 103 102  
R-squared (centered) 0.782 0.774 0.772 0.780 0.744  
Shea partial R-square (settlers) 0.491 0.492 0.502 0.633 0.536  
Shea partial R-square (GDP pc)   0.399 0.524 0.411  
Shea partial R-square (Trade)     0.203  
LM test (p-value) 0.0021 0.0023 0.0244 0.0017 0.351  
F test 21.60 13.80 8.19 16.17 1.02  
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.151 0.210 0.298 0.243 0.211  
       
 First stage results 
Dependent variable: European settlers 
Population density in 1500 (log) -0.782** 
(0.363) 
-0.797* 
(0.442) 
-0.969** 
(0.420) 
-0.596 
(0.366) 
-0.603 
(0.373) 
 
Indigenous mortality dummy 13.38*** 
(2.55) 
13.54*** 
(2.63) 
11.38*** 
(3.34) 
10.86*** 
(2.75) 
12.85*** 
(2.35) 
 
Latitude  0.025 
(0.038) 
-0.068 
(0.041) 
-0.107*** 
(0.038) 
-0.089** 
(0.035) 
 
Risk of malaria transmission    -5.69** 
(2.18) 
-8.04*** 
(2.40) 
-7.30*** 
(2.34) 
 
Fraction of land area within 
100km of sea coast  
   -4.75*** 
(1.31) 
-4.07*** 
(1.19) 
 
Includes control variables in set X YES YES YES YES YES  
R-squared (centered) 0.803 0.804 0.845 0.868 0.879  
F test 21.60 13.80 19.05 28.60 49.51  
       
       
 First stage results 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita (log) 
Population density in 1500 (log)   0.030 
(0.058) 
-0.032 
(0.057) 
-0.032 
(0.057) 
 
Indigenous mortality dummy   -0.220 
(0.431) 
-0.133 
(0.386) 
0.043 
(0.374) 
 
Latitude   0.012 
(0.012) 
0.018* 
(0.010) 
0.020** 
(0.009) 
 
Risk of malaria transmission    -1.52*** 
(0.430) 
-1.12*** 
(0.380) 
-1.06*** 
(0.378) 
 
Fraction of land area within 
100km of sea coast  
   0.797*** 
(0.219) 
0.858*** 
(0.220) 
 
Includes control variables in set X   YES YES YES  
R-squared (centered)   0.689 0.731 0.736  
F test   20.41 22.09 24.44  
       
 First stage results 
Dependent variable: Trade openness 
Population density in 1500 (log)     -6.46 
(4.60) 
 
Indigenous mortality dummy     -83.96** 
(40.78) 
 
Latitude     -1.10 
(1.09) 
 
Risk of malaria transmission      -56.22 
(39.76) 
 
Fraction of land area within 
100km of sea coast  
    51.76*** 
(18.03) 
 
Includes control variables in set X     YES  
R-squared (centered)     0.327  
F test     2.60  
Notes: Dependent variable is the World Bank corruption index (2005) which measures the presence of corruption. 
White-corrected standard errors in parentheses weighted by the inverse of the standard error. Constant term not 
reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. Regressions based on two-step efficient GMM estimation with 
instruments as described in the penultimate row. The Hansen J-test p-value refers to the overidentification test of 
all instruments, with null hypothesis that instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. The LM test p-value 
refers to the LM Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic, which is a generalization to non-iid errors of the LM version 
of Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test, with null hypothesis that the first-stage regression is 
underidentified. The F test refers to the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk Wald F statistic which tests weak identification 
of the excluded instruments. The null hypothesis is that the first-stage regression is weakly identified. The lower 
panels of the table report the coefficient estimates of the excluded instruments from the first-stage regressions. 
The null hypothesis of the F test in the first-stage regressions is that the coefficients on the excluded instruments 
equal zero. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
Table 4 
Alternative country samples 
 
Dependent variable: World Bank corruption index (2005) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
European settlers 0.020* 
(0.011) 
0.020* 
(0.011) 
0.022* 
(0.012) 
0.022* 
(0.012) 
0.024* 
(0.014) 
0.041** 
(0.018) 
0.047** 
(0.023) 
        
GDP per capita (log) -0.655*** 
(0.106) 
-0.654*** 
(0.103) 
-0.667*** 
(0.117) 
-0.667*** 
(0.119) 
-0.740*** 
(0.143) 
-0.861*** 
(0.155) 
-0.921*** 
(0.162) 
Former British colony -0.305* 
(0.177) 
-0.368** 
(0.190) 
-0.306 
(0.197) 
-0.378* 
(0.215) 
0.251 
(0.305) 
0.386 
(0.357) 
0.166 
(0.365) 
Former French colony -0.159 
(0.207) 
-0.201 
(0.207) 
-0.164 
(0.233) 
-0.222 
(0.245) 
-0.155 
(0.285) 
-0.177 
(0.330) 
-0.453 
(0.399) 
Former Spanish or Portuguese 
colony 
-0.066 
(0.287) 
-0.092 
(0.283) 
-0.083 
(0.310) 
-0.131 
(0.319) 
-0.046 
(0.308) 
-0.228 
(0.366) 
-0.582 
(0.545) 
Former colony of other power  0.011 
(0.186) 
-0.114 
(0.195) 
0.007 
(0.256) 
-0.114 
(0.301) 
   
British legal origin -0.241 
(0.212) 
-0.205 
(0.222) 
-0.263 
(0.218) 
-0.249 
(0.218) 
-0.915*** 
(0.242) 
-0.942*** 
(0.265) 
-0.975*** 
(0.313) 
French legal origin -0.349*** 
(0.123) 
-0.335*** 
(0.131) 
-0.365** 
(0.150) 
-0.362** 
(0.143) 
-0.491*** 
(0.155) 
-0.505*** 
(0.165) 
-0.499** 
(0.214) 
German legal origin -0.324 
(0.270) 
 -0.316 
(0.368) 
    
        
Countries  87 85 83 80 71 62 53 
R-square (centered) 0.538 0.485 0.529 0.449 0.461 0.421 0.377 
Shea partial R-square (settlers) 0.507 0.484 0.520 0.513 0.521 0.459 0.403 
Shea partial R-square (GDP pc) 0.429 0.408 0.443 0.453 0.460 0.456 0.427 
LM test (p-value) 0.0010 0.0014 0.0015 0.0026 0.0095 0.0028 0.0051 
F test 12.56 11.12 13.36 13.24 12.03 5.88 5.59 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.313 0.307 0.300 0.280 0.155 0.276 0.262 
Exogenous variables used as 
instruments 
As in Table 
3, column 4 
As in Table 3, 
column 4 
As in Table 
3, column 4 
As in Table 3, 
column 4 
As in Table 
3, column 4 
As in Table 3, 
column 4 and 
also adds AJR’s 
(2001) settler 
mortality 
As in Table 3, 
column 4 and 
also adds 
Albouy’s (2012) 
settler mortality  
Country sample Excludes 
high-income 
European 
countries 
Excludes 
high-income 
countries 
Excludes 
European 
countries 
Excludes 
European  and 
high-income 
countries 
Excludes 
non-
colonized 
countries 
Excludes non-
colonized 
countries  
Excludes non-
colonized 
countries  
Notes: See Table 3. High-income countries are defined according to GNI per capita as reported by the 2013 World Bank country classifications. Non-
colonized countries are those with a zero value of European settlers. Missing coefficient estimates are due to collinearities as the sample size varies. 
 
 
Table 5 
Alternative proxies for European settlers and interactive effects 
 
Dependent variable: World Bank corruption index (2005) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
European settlers 
  0.057** 
(0.022) 
0.051*** 
(0.018) 
 
European settlers 1900 0.019** 
(0.008) 
 -0.018 
(0.014) 
 
 
European settlers 1975  0.012* 
(0.007) 
 -0.010 
(0.009) 
 
European settlers * Former 
British colony 
 
 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
European settlers * Former 
French colony 
 
 
 
 
0.037** 
(0.015) 
European settlers * Former 
Spanish or Portuguese colony 
 
 
 
 
0.020** 
(0.009) 
European settlers * Former 
colony of other power 
 
 
 
 
1.61* 
(0.917) 
      
GDP per capita (log) -0.690*** 
(0.077) 
-0.663*** 
(0.076) 
-0.697*** 
(0.066) 
-0.705*** 
(0.066) 
-0.655*** 
(0.076) 
Former British colony -0.472*** 
(0.175) 
-0.442** 
(0.171) 
-0.456** 
(0.182) 
-0.468** 
(0.183) 
-0.323* 
(0.171) 
Former French colony -0.288 
(0.210) 
-0.220 
(0.205) 
-0.398* 
(0.210) 
-0.417* 
(0.214) 
-0.241 
(0.209) 
Former Spanish or Portuguese 
colony 
-0.251 
(0.293) 
-0.113 
(0.280) 
-0.508* 
(0.264) 
-0.546** 
(0.264) 
-0.127 
(0.271) 
Former colony of other power  -0.172 
(0.192) 
-0.146 
(0.192) 
-0.172 
(0.191) 
-0.180 
(0.192) 
-0.222 
(0.193) 
British legal origin -0.251 
(0.196) 
-0.200 
(0.192) 
-0.271 
(0.200) 
-0.285 
(0.200) 
-0.352* 
(0.200) 
French legal origin -0.381*** 
(0.139) 
-0.360** 
(0.140) 
-0.380*** 
(0.136) 
-0.390*** 
(0.135) 
-0.492*** 
(0.126) 
Scandinavian legal origin -1.52*** 
(0.172) 
-1.54*** 
(0.173) 
-1.50*** 
(0.165) 
-1.50*** 
(0.165) 
-1.59*** 
(0.171) 
German legal origin -0.902*** 
(0.325) 
-0.915*** 
(0.325) 
-0.905*** 
(0.325) 
-0.900*** 
(0.325) 
-1.00*** 
(0.335) 
      
Countries  96 96 96 96 103 
R-square (centered) 0.756 0.760 0.787 0.777 0.787 
Shea partial R-square (settlers) 0.566 0.558 0.304 0.318 - 
Shea partial R-square (GDP pc) 0.565 0.576 0.560 0.559 0.502 
LM test (p-value) 0.0085 0.0237 0.0926 0.0275 0.0001 
F test 15.70 14.28 1.90 2.11 15.50 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.190 0.166 0.355 0.392 0.342 
Notes: See Table 3. Exogenous variables used as instruments are as in Table 3, column 4.
  
Table 6 
Alternative Measures of Corruption 
 
Dependent variable: corruption indicators 
 World Bank Transparency International ICRG 
 (1) 
2004 
(2) 
2002 
(3) 
1998 
(4) 
2004 
(5) 
2002 
(6) 
1998 
(7) 
2004 
(8) 
2002 
(9) 
1998 
European settlers 0.021* 
(0.011) 
0.031*** 
(0.011) 
0.025** 
(0.011) 
0.058** 
(0.025) 
0.061** 
(0.030) 
0.093*** 
 (0.031) 
0.031* 
(0.018) 
0.035* 
(0.017) 
0.038** 
(0.018) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.666*** 
(0.074) 
-0.700*** 
(0.078) 
-0.693*** 
(0.083) 
-1.39*** 
(0.189) 
-1.74*** 
(0.252) 
-1.74*** 
(0.201) 
-0.355*** 
(0.129) 
-0.438*** 
(0.133) 
-0.603*** 
(0.164) 
          
Includes control variables in set X YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Countries 103 103 103 92 73 64 93 93 93 
R-square (centered) 0.771 0.748 0.786 0.845 0.852 0.820 0.587 0.585 0.419 
LM test (p-value) 0.0020 0.0015 0.0028 0.0014 0.0955 0.2956 0.0064 0.0064 0.0064 
F test 16.22 15.83 15.83 21.76 16.65 9.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.593 0.725 0.345 0.429 0.667 0.678 0.928 0.759 0.878 
 Notes: Dependent variable is the World Bank (WB) corruption index, the Transparency International (TI) corruption perception index, and the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) corruption index, all in various years. Exogenous variables used as instruments are as in Table 3, column 4. For further information see notes of Table 
3. 
 Table 7 
Accounting for Political Institutions 
 
Dependent variable: World Bank corruption index (2005) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
European settlers 0.021** 
(0.010) 
0.021** 
(0.010) 
0.022** 
(0.009) 
0.020** 
(0.009) 
0.029*** 
(0.011) 
0.026** 
(0.012) 
0.031** 
(0.012) 
0.024*** 
(0.006) 
0.028** 
(0.011) 
0.030*** 
(0.009) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.541*** 
(0.085) 
-0.540*** 
(0.091) 
-0.518*** 
(0.105) 
-0.511*** 
(0.095) 
-0.598*** 
(0.087) 
-0.577*** 
(0.126) 
-0.624*** 
(0.111) 
-0.611*** 
(0.095) 
-0.601*** 
(0.087) 
-0.626*** 
(0.102) 
           
Political rights  -0.118*** 
(0.028) 
-0.158 
(0.127) 
-0.103*** 
(0.028) 
-0.106*** 
(0.027) 
      
Political rights squared  0.005 
(0.014) 
        
Democratic since 1930 (number of 
years) 
  -0.003 
(0.004) 
       
Democratic since 1950 (dummy)    -0.223 
(0.184) 
      
Freedom of press     -0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.017*** 
(0.003) 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.016*** 
(0.004) 
Newspaper circulation 1996      -0.001 
(0.001) 
    
Presidential democracy       -0.008 
(0.070) 
   
Pure plurality system        0.283 
(0.187) 
  
Open-list system        -0.049 
(0.139) 
  
District magnitude        -0.002 
(0.001) 
  
Open-list * District magnitude        -0.002 
(0.010) 
  
Federation         0.110 
(0.121) 
 
Fiscal decentralization          -0.002 
(0.005) 
           
Includes control variables in set X YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Countries  103 103 103 103 103 99 102 53 103 36 
R-square (centered) 0.811 0.812 0.814 0.813 0.817 0.822 0.816 0.904 0.820 0.918 
LM test (p-value) 0.0011 0.0014 0.0001 0.0003 0.0065 0.0008 0.0038 0.0440 0.0055 0.0847 
F test 12.06 11.70 15.50 12.36 8.47 7.04 7.92 14.95 8.18 4.94 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.118 0.111 0.105 0.109 0.182 0.150 0.142 - 0.148 - 
Notes: SeeTable 3. Exogenous variables used as instruments are as in Table 3, column 4. 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Controlling for Rents, State Regulation, Market Competition, Gender, Inflation, and Other Factors 
 
Dependent variable: World Bank corruption index (2005) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
European settlers 0.031** 
(0.012) 
0.028** 
(0.012) 
0.023* 
(0.012) 
0.023*** 
(0.009) 
0.025*** 
(0.009) 
0.020** 
(0.008) 
0.027** 
(0.011) 
0.036*** 
(0.012) 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.696*** 
(0.094) 
-0.715*** 
(0.113) 
-0.799*** 
(0.148) 
-0.704*** 
(0.076) 
-0.725*** 
(0.077) 
-0.667*** 
(0.080) 
-0.740*** 
(0.080) 
-0.724*** 
(0.088) 
-0.869*** 
(0.082) 
 
         
Fuel exports 0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
Imports (% of GDP) -0.004 
(0.003) 
        
Year opened to trade  0.008 
(0.009) 
       
Education   0.021 
(0.062) 
      
Women in lower house of 
parliament (%) 
   -0.012* 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
   
Women in government at 
ministerial level (%) 
    -0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.014*** 
(0.005) 
   
Government party’s margin of 
victory 
     -0.637** 
(0.320) 
   
Fractionalization of parties      -0.690** 
(0.274) 
   
Inflation rate        0.002 
(0.078) 
  
Inequality (Gini, 2002)        -0.002 
(0.008) 
 
Dummy for Latin America         0.123 
(0.228) 
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa         -0.377** 
(0.157) 
          
Includes control variables in set X YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Countries  86 80 73 77 66 65 75 67 87 
R-square (centered) 0.812 0.826 0.848 0.823 0.853 0.865 0.818 0.839 0.822 
LM test (p-value) 0.0077 0.0150 0.0025 0.0154 0.0965 0.0512 0.0170 0.0497 0.0209 
F test 12.58 9.19 6.05 15.83 12.46 11.96 13.01 12.54 6.79 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.008 0.216 0.248 0.446 0.347 0.237 0.418 0.073 0.517 
Notes: See Table 3. Exogenous variables used as instruments are as in Table 3, column 4. 
 
